Summary

When Jessica Wachter, a finance professor at the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School, wanted to assess AI’s impact on the economy over the next few years, she faced a long list of business and technical uncertainties. So she started with what she calls a “remarkable fact” that is not in question: A handful of so-called hyperscalers are investing huge amounts of money to build AI data centers. Instead of trying to predict how useful and widely deployed AI models will be, she simply asked how fast the hyperscalers’ earnings will need to grow to justify their spending through 2027, when—she and her collaborator estimate—expenditures will reach nearly 750 billion this year, building massive data centers scattered across the country. And the spending spree shows no signs of slowing. According to some projections, total AI capital investments from the hyperscaler companies—Alphabet, Microsoft, Amazon, Meta, and Oracle (which partners with OpenAI)—could be more [than 150 billion to 120 billion were devoured by AI infrastructure spending, leaving it with a free cash deficit of some 41 billion. Assuming a 10% return—the minimum that would be acceptable to most investors—“required” annual revenues will be roughly 280 billion in private-sector AI expenditures by the end of 2026](https://www.atlantafed.org/research-and-data/publications/policy-hub-macroblog/2026/05/06/how-much-firms-spending-on-ai-and-what-will-happen-to-headcounts). That’s good news for the hyperscalers. But it comes with a dose of bad news for those worried about AI’s impact on jobs. The executives expect to increase the productivity of their companies by increasing their sales while significantly cutting the number of employees. If AI improves productivity by destroying jobs, public backlash to the technology—the kind we have seen around data centers, for example—will likely get worse. Perhaps it’s worth adding one more wager to the parlay bet described by Gensler: The public and local communities must feel that they are also benefiting from the massive investments in AI. And let’s not forget how interdependent these wagers are; if productivity growth comes from companies running models like DeepSeek, then the hyperscalers’ revenues could collapse. If productivity comes from cutting jobs, a public backlash could block many of the planned investments—and stunt anticipated revenues. We will need to win all the wagers for the hyperscalers’ bet to pay off. We’re all part of the AI gamble now It was one thing when the AI companies were spending cash they had accumulated over the years to build their own data centers. Then the risk was largely limited to their own balance sheets and shareholders. But it’s a higher-stakes game when much of the money is borrowed. Morgan Stanley, for one, calculates that more than half of the 10 billion in late 2024 it was Meta’s largest planned data center. Greeted with much enthusiasm by state and local politicians, the project, located in the rural northeast corner of the state, was seen as a boon to the community. Entergy Louisiana, the state’s largest utility, rushed forward with proposals to build three large natural-gas power plants to service the massive data center. Then last fall—the projected cost was now 50 billion (so far, Meta hasn’t said whether Blue Owl will be involved in financing the expansion). Meanwhile, Entergy is now planning to build seven more gas-fired power plants, bringing the total capacity of the facilities to around 7.5 gigawatts—some six times the amount of electricity used by New Orleans. "" If the complex financing is a puzzle to many investors and even financial experts, it is even more baffling to those directly affected by the construction of the data center. The main worry concerns how Entergy’s spending on the natural-gas power plants will affect electricity prices, and who will be left paying the bill for the power if Meta walks away. Entergy says it has a 20-year guarantee from Meta that the company will purchase electricity over that period to cover the costs of the power plants and related infrastructure. But there are skeptics, especially given how fast the fortunes of the AI industry are changing. “In four years, is Mark Zuckerberg still going to be interested in this? Or is he going to throw in the towel?” asks Paul Arbaje, a senior analyst at the Union of Concerned Scientists, which has been advocating, largely unsuccessfully, for the Louisiana Public Service Commission to provide more transparency around the data center and its financing. Even if the 20-year deal holds, consumer advocates are worried that Meta or its partners won’t fully cover all the costs, including those associated with operating and maintaining the power plants—and those additional costs that could be passed on to residential ratepayers. What’s more, says Logan Burke, the executive director of the Alliance for Affordable Energy, if Meta doesn’t end up needing as much power as Entergy planned (these projections are not public), consumers could be left paying for the surplus produced by the plants. And if Meta terminates its leases early? “It gets complicated very quickly,” says Burke, who questions whether the shifting roster of financial entities will honor existing agreements. “That everybody is going to do what they’re saying they’re going to do over the next 20 years is just hard to believe.” For UCS’s Arbaje the bottom line is this: “They’re making huge bets that these data centers will be worth it. Bet with your own money, not with ratepayer money.” After the bubble Predicting when the AI investment bubble will burst is a fool’s errand. But there is little doubt a day of reckoning is coming, given the irrational exuberance that has overtaken the hyperscalers and their investors. Of course, you might argue that this time is different, and that the rules of accounting and lessons of economic history don’t apply—that AI is too transformative. Maybe, but don’t count on it. “History tells us that at some point you get a retrenchment, and it’s just a question of when and how severe,” says Sloan’s Gensler. It could be that today’s $750 billion spending rate “goes flat” or decreases next year. Or, he suggests, “we’re now in 2028 or 2029, and then all of sudden they’re retrenching because they’ve got enough capacity.” But, he adds, “you can be pretty assured there’ll be a retrenchment.” Though a so-called retrenchment might be inevitable, it’s worth keeping in mind that the fates of the financial bubble and the underlying AI technology revolution could be very different. Already, some Silicon Valley insiders are rooting for a crash; in a recent blog post the longtime venture capitalist Vijay Pande wrote that “the coming crash would be the best thing that happens to this technology.” The argument makes some sense. A crash could make AI investments more rational, calm the impulse to build billion-dollar data centers on every vacant field that CEOs fly over, and refocus investors on how to use the technology to create sustainable value. But we should probably be careful what we wish for. After the bursting of the dot-com bubble at the beginning of the 2000s, hundreds of thousands lost their jobs, large and small companies alike went bankrupt, the economy of Silicon Valley and San Francisco was decimated (at least for a while), and the shocks sent the US into a mild recession in 2001. For the financial community and many tech workers, it was no fun. Even more devastating for the economy and the average American was the great recession that began in late 2007. Comparing the financial engineering leading up to it and the methods deployed by hyperscalers today is sobering. So-called special purpose vehicles (SPVs) are back! If Columbia’s Van Nieuwerburgh is right about the dangers of letting investments from the hyperscalers get entangled throughout the economy, the fallout could be severe. But technologies survived and even prospered in the aftermath of both downturns. The early 2000s, even in the face of the dot-com fiasco, were a time of great innovation and tech optimism. The froth came off the spending on silly technologies, helping to focus investments on more promising ones. It’s no coincidence that each of the hyperscalers rose out of the ashes of the crash or started up shortly after. The fiber-optic infrastructure built during the feverish telecom bubble that ran parallel to the dot-com one is still the backbone of much of today’s communication infrastructure; we wouldn’t have Facebook or Amazon or Google without it. This time, however, we’re facing a unique risk: The huge financial investments by the hyperscalers have ensnared the future of AI itself with the fortunes of the massive data centers spreading around the country. The logic is founded on a deeply held belief about the power of scaling in AI; the bigger you build it, the smarter it gets. That might be true, but it’s unproven and a risky bet. There are already plenty of red flags, from strong public opposition to the construction of new data centers to the competitive threat from cheaper, good-enough AI models to the rapid improvement of small, local AI models. None of these trends point toward a future dominated by frontier models housed in massive, billion-dollar data centers. The financial bubble around the colossal spending by the hyperscalers will likely burst eventually—or maybe soon. It might be financially painful, but we’ll survive. Wall Street will survive. AI itself will survive, though it may look different and lose some of today’s hubris. The financial fate and future utility of the massive data centers fueled by trillions of dollars of spending, on the other hand, are far less certain. Deep Dive Artificial intelligence A fundamental flaw leaves LLMs strikingly vulnerable to attack It makes it easy to trick them into doing things they shouldn’t, such as telling you how to sabotage an aircraft’s navigation system. AI is more likely than humans to form biases when hiring AI doesn’t just learn stereotypes from its training. It can cook up new ones, too. Stay connected Get the latest updates from MIT Technology Review Discover special offers, top stories, upcoming events, and more.

By David Rotman

Original Article